大学院
過去（2019年度）の授業の情報です
学内のオンライン授業の情報漏洩防止のため，URLやアカウント、教室の記載は削除しております。
最終更新日：2024年4月1日
授業計画や教室は変更となる可能性があるため、必ずUTASで最新の情報を確認して下さい。
UTASにアクセスできない方は、担当教員または部局教務へお問い合わせ下さい。
最終更新日：2024年4月1日
授業計画や教室は変更となる可能性があるため、必ずUTASで最新の情報を確認して下さい。
UTASにアクセスできない方は、担当教員または部局教務へお問い合わせ下さい。
契約と組織の経済学
契約と組織の経済学
This course discusses contract theory and organizational economics at a graduate level. The aim is to provide a basic ground of theoretical frameworks of contract theory and information economics and to stimulate participants research activities on organizational economics and related issues (including both theoretical and empirical works).
The course is mainly for the second year graduate students or above.
Nevertheless, other students who are interested in researching contract theory and organizational economics are also welcome as long as
they satisfy the prerequisite described below.
The course is mainly for the second year graduate students or above.
Nevertheless, other students who are interested in researching contract theory and organizational economics are also welcome as long as
they satisfy the prerequisite described below.
時間割／共通科目コード
コース名
教員
学期
時限
291329-06
GEC-EC6327L1
契約と組織の経済学
石原 章史
月曜4限、月曜5限
マイリストに追加
マイリストから削除
講義使用言語
英語
単位
2
実務経験のある教員による授業科目
NO
他学部履修
可
開講所属
経済学研究科
授業計画
(The following schedule is subject to change.)
1. Introduction
2. Incentive Problems
(a) Moral Hazard: Basics
(b) Multitasking
(c) Rewarding Systems
(d) Incomplete Contracting and Organizational Design
3. Adaptation and Coordination
(a) Transaction Cost Economics
(b) Adaptation and Information
(c) Adaptation versus Coordination
4. Dynamic Contracting
(a) Relational Contracting
(b) Experimentation
(c) Career Concerns and Reputation
Although the topics to be discussed are mainly theoretical, we will also be careful about the relationships with empirical works.
授業の方法
The course is based on a series of lectures. Readings and problem sets will be assigned.
成績評価方法
The grade will be based on (1) problem sets; (2) research proposals; and/or (3) mock referee reports on scholarly papers. The detail will be annouced later.
教科書
No textbook. Lecture notes, mainly based on scholarly articles, will be distributed, .
参考書
Gibbons, R. and Roberts, J. (2013): Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. (2002): The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press.
Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2005): Contract Theory, MIT Press. Incomplete Contracts
Hart, O. (1995): Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structures, Oxford University Press.
Aghion,P.,Dewatripont,M., Legros,P.,andZingales,L.(2016): The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Oxford University Press.
(In Japanese)
伊藤秀史 (2003): 『契約の経済理論』 有斐閣
オリバー・ハート ( 鳥居昭夫 訳 ) (2010): 『企業 契約 金融構造』慶應義塾大学出版会
履修上の注意
The lecture will be in English (subject to change conditional on the participants).
If you intend to participate this course,
(a) please find the instructor's website via ISS website (or search engines), where I provide a detailed syllabus (including reading lists) and important information on the course; and
(b) please let me know your participation via e-mail before the course starts (just for the instructor's understanding of the participants' background).
Please visit the course website (at least once in a week), from which important information as well as the lecture notes are distributed. where the lecture note will be uploaded weekly basis.
その他
Students must have knowledge of (at least) the intermediate level (ideally the advanced level) of microeconomics and mathematics: especially, game theory, economics of information, constrained optimization, and probability.
