大学院
HOME 大学院 Economics of Contracts and Organizations
学内のオンライン授業の情報漏洩防止のため,URLやアカウントの記載は削除しております。
最終更新日:2022年4月21日

Economics of Contracts and Organizations

Economics of Contracts and Organizations
This course discusses contract theory and organizational economics, with emphasis on incentive and agency problems, at a graduate level. The aim is to provide a basic ground of theoretical frameworks of contract theory and information economics and to stimulate participants research activities on organizational economics and related issues (including both theoretical and empirical works).

The course is mainly for the second year graduate students or above. Nevertheless, other students/(post-doctoral) scholars who are interested in this course are also welcome as long as they satisfy the prerequisite described below.
MIMA Search
時間割/共通科目コード
コース名
教員
学期
時限
291328-05
GEC-EC6835L2
Economics of Contracts and Organizations
石原 章史
A1
月曜3限、月曜4限
マイリストに追加
マイリストから削除
教室
国際学術総合研究棟 517演習室
講義使用言語
日本語/英語
単位
2
実務経験のある教員による授業科目
NO
他学部履修
開講所属
経済学研究科
授業計画
(The following schedule is subject to change.) 1. Introduction 2. Moral Hazard: Basics 3. Multitasking 4. Evaluation Systems 5. Incomplete Contracting 6. Dynamic Contracting 7. Miscellaneous issues Although the topics to be discussed are mainly theoretical, we will also discuss relationships with empirical works.
授業の方法
The course will be based on a series of lectures. Readings and problem sets will be assigned.
成績評価方法
The grade will be based on two essays (mid-term and final), assigning mock referee reports on scholarly papers or research proposals.
教科書
The lecture note will be distributed. The note is mainly based on original scholarly articles as well as the following surveys. The reading list will be distributed.
参考書
Salanie, B. (2005): The Economics of Contracts, A Primer Second Edition, MIT Press. Macho-Stadler, I. and Perez-Castrillo, J.D. (2001): An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Second Edition, Oxford University Press. Laffont, J.-J.and Martimort, D.(2002): The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press. Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2005): Contract Theory, MIT Press. Hart,O.(1995): Firms,Contracts,and Financial Structures, Oxford University Press. Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Legros, P., and Zingales, L. (2016): The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Oxford University Press. Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1992): Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall. Gibbons,R. and Roberts,J.(2013): Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
履修上の注意
The lecture will be in English (subject to change conditional on the participants). Participants must have knowledge of (ideally advanced or at least intermediate) microeconomics and mathematics: especially, game theory, economics of information, constrained optimization, and probability. Please notify the instructor your participation via e-mail before the course starts (just for the instructor's understanding of the participants' background). The course material and important information are distributed via the course website on ITC-LMS. Please visit the course website at least once in a week.