学部後期課程
HOME 学部後期課程 Game Theory II
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最終更新日:2023年10月20日

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Game Theory II

On repeated games
Repeated games are a class of dynamic games where players play a fixed game (called a stage game) repeatedly over time. Despite their simple definition, repeated games admit various equilibrium strategies that cannot be explained if we analyze stage games separately. On the other hand, in many environments, so-called folk theorems hold, and the limit set of equilibrium payoffs is characterized by feasibility and individual rationality. Repeated games provide a basic framework to understand cartel and collusion as well as one of the evolutionary explanations for why humans and vampire bats sometimes behave altruistically.

In this class, we study repeated games through Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and more recent papers.
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時間割/共通科目コード
コース名
教員
学期
時限
0704188
FEC-EC5801L3
Game Theory II
高橋 悟
A2
月曜1限、木曜1限
マイリストに追加
マイリストから削除
講義使用言語
英語
単位
2
実務経験のある教員による授業科目
NO
他学部履修
開講所属
経済学部
授業計画
Based on Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and more recent papers. Details depend on the number of participants and their interest.
授業の方法
Lectures and students' presentation
成績評価方法
Homework and presentation
教科書
Mailath and Samuelson (2006), Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-run Relationships. (Typos and corrections are available in George's website.)
参考書
Additional papers to be announced.
履修上の注意
Students are expected to be familiar with basic game theory (at the level of core micro).